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OF SETTLEMENT AND THEIR EFFECT

Many people, including lawyers, often believe that the settlement of a case terminates further controversy. A valid settlement,
governed by contract law principles, will serve to preclude the
claimant from further assertion of a claim against the settlor regarding the subject matter of the parties' agreement.' The agreement, however, as a general rule, does not likewise operate to bind
nonsettling parties from assertion of contribution claims,2 nor does
it extend to release nonsettlors from liability. 8 While the purpose
of settlement may be to conclude disputes between settling parties,
when viewed in the context of multiple tortfeasor controversies, it
frequently signals the commencement of litigation as the parties
seek to establish the most advantageous position concerning respective liabilities.4 Therefore, before settlement is made, careful
consideration should be given the rights created and limitations
imposed thereby.
1. "[A] plaintiff may preclude himself from recovering from one of several tortfeasors
without barring his action against the others if he does so by way of a covenant not to sue,
or a release.
... Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L.
REV. 150, 170-71 (1947); see, e.g., Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764,
767-68 (Tex. 1964) (plaintiff bound by express terms of covenant not to sue); Gillam v.
Alford, 69 Tex. 267, 271, 6 S.W. 757, 759 (1887) (voluntary settlement agreement, an arm's
length transaction, enforced per express terms); Comment, Settlements in Multiple
Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 76 & n.7 (1978) (terms of
settlement agreement within parties' discretion; generally not subject to court's approval).
2. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1964); see TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (procedural application of
comparative fault allocation upon non-settling defendants); id. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971)
(contribution statute; superceded by provisions of article 2212a in pure negligence actions);
cf. Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586, 587-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1964, writ ref'd) (tortfeasor discharging liability of all joint tortfeasors under agreed judgment entitled to seek contribution). See generally Comment, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 326, 330-31 (1965) (elements of contribution suit).
3. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971) (release only effective as
to named party in agreement). At common law, the release of a joint tortfeasor was construed as a complete surrender of claimant's cause of action. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301 (4th ed. 1971). Texas' abandonment of the common law unity of
release rule in McMillen v. Klingensmith has recently been extended to encompass settlements in vicarious liability controversies. See Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d
805, 806-07 (Tex. 1980) (release of employee or agent does not release principal) (overruling
Spradley v. McCrackin, 505 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
4. See Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 87-91 (1978) (trial strategy; claimant, settling tortfeasor, non-settling
defendant).
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Policy considerations favoring settlement agreements have given
rise to the body of law surrounding the judicial treatment accorded
settlements. This article will examine certain considerations which

should be given to the settlement process, including: the doctrines
of release and satisfaction; various types of settlement and their
effect upon joint and several tortfeasor liability; and the impact of
settlement upon claims for indemnity and contribution.

II.

FROM PLAINTIFF'S VIEWPOINT: SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

A fundamental principle governing the effect of settlements in
multiple tortfeasor controversies is that a plaintiff is entitled to
but one satisfaction for a single wrong.' The distinction drawn be-

tween a satisfaction and a release is applicable to the extent that a
release may or may not fulfill plaintiff's claim for compensation. A

further distinction may arise, depending on whether the nature of
5. The principle that settlement and compromise are encouraged by the courts, as being in the public interest, is well established in the Texas judicial system. See, e.g., Knutson
v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. 1980); Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 771-73 (Tex. 1964); Gillam v. Alford, 69 Tex. 267, 271, 6 S.W. 757, 759
(1887).
6. Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935, opinion adopted); see, e.g., T. L. James & Co. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex.
1977) (payment of judgment into registry of court under terms of judgment constitutes full
compensation); McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1971) (satisfaction
equals acceptance of full compensation for injury); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 170-71 (1947) (application of rule of one satisfaction for single wrong to partial settlements).
7. The distinction to be made between a satisfaction and a release may be stated thusly: "[A] satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for the injury; a release is a surrender of the cause of action, which may be gratuitous, or given for inadequate consideration." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Stewart v. Mathes, 528 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ) (applying law of contracts to settlement agreement); Wedegartner v. Reichert, 218 S.W.2d 304, 310
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court will not inquire into adequacy of consideration). A release of one tortfeasor discharges from liability only the named tortfeasor,
and satisfies the claimant's cause of action as to the settlor. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467
S.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Tex. 1971). A settlement with one tortfeasor may, however, operate to
discharge all tortfeasors when the amount received fully satisfies the claim. See Bradshaw v.
Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935, opinion
adopted) (prior settlement with joint tortfeasor in amount equal to judgment obtained
against nontortfeasor); cf. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 773 (Tex.
1964) (applying article 2212) (settlement with joint tortfeasor releases proportionate share
of claim). See also Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Tex. 1980) (distinguishing concepts under theory of Respondeat Superior).
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the injury is characterized as divisible or indivisible.' Interaction of
the concepts of release and satisfaction in the divisible-indivisible
injury context serve as focal points for the plaintiff's consideration
in entering into a settlement agreement.
A. Indivisible Injury by Multiple Tortfeasors:Joint and Several
Liability
If the independent conduct of two or more tortfeasors combines
to produce an indivisible injury, the tortfeasors incur joint and several liability even though there is no common duty, design, or concert of action.9 A determination of indivisible injury and imposition of joint and several liability, as enunciated in Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.,10 is based upon the impracticability of reasonable apportionment of damages.1" The primary concern under the rule of indivisible injury is to enable the injured
party to obtain full relief by allowing joinder of all tortfeasors
when necessary. This concern renders moot the theoretical possibilities of divisible fault; the court's interest lies in a realistic ap8. An indivisible injury involves concurrent or successive acts producing a single injury;
a divisible injury is characterized as injury involving apportionable damages. See Sales,
Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 217, 25561, 267-70 (1977). See generally, Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 662-66 (1974).
9. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d 731,
734 (1952). Indivisible injuries generally arise under successive acts by independent
tortfeasors which combine "to cause an injury incapable of apportionment." Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 217, 259 (1977);
see, e.g., Krishnan v. Garza, 570 S.W.2d 578, 582-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ) (liability against hospital and doctor joint and several when surgeon's negligence in
failing to remove sponge from abdomen coupled with hospital's failure to properly review Xrays); Armendariz v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d 400, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (liability against breaching party and interfering party is joint and several when
plaintiff injured by breach of contract); Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 217, 256 n.179 (1977) (digest of cases).
10. 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
11. Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734. As stated by the Landers' court,
[w]here the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible
injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable
certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and
severally liable for the entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judgment against anyone separately or against all in the one suit.
Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734; accord, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at
314 (4th ed. 1971) (when no logical basis for apportionment exists, only practical course is to
hold each defendant liable for the entire loss).
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praisal of the feasibility of segregating and identifying the portion
of injury attributable to all contributing causes."' If the injuries
produced by an occurrence are construed as indivisible in nature,
each tortfeasor is liable for plaintiff's entire damages under the
concept of joint and several liability.' s The burden of apportionment is imposed upon the tortfeasors."'
The indivisible injury rule allows the plaintiff to sue several
tortfeasors jointly and severally for the entire damages occasioned

by the tortious conduct of each which caused the injury.15 If, how-

ever, a plaintiff's cause of action is grounded in indivisible injury,
there is at law but a single injury for which there can be but one
satisfaction."6 Thus, if the claimant has recovered the amount required for full satisfaction of damages, whether by payment of a
judgment 7 or under a settlement, 8 all others who may be jointly
12. See Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d
731, 734 (1952). The Landers decision expressly overruled Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23
S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, judgmt adopted), thereby abrogating the requirement
of concert of action or unity of design from the concept of joint and several liability. See
Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 255-56, 248 S.W.2d 731, 73234 (1952). The reasoning of the court in extending joint and several liability to independent
tortfeasors indicated a discontent with the burden of proof facing a plaintiff seeking to establish a correct apportionment of damages under procedural requirements mandating a
severance of claims as to independent tortfeasors before being allowed a satisfactory recovery. See id. at 255-56, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
13. Riley v. Industrial Fin. Serv. Co., 157 Tex. 306, 310, 302 S.W.2d 652, 655-56 (1957)
(citing Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.). In Riley plaintiff brought suit
against several finance companies alleging injury due to harsh and unreasonable collection
efforts. Defendant Industrial Finance appealed the judgment of the trial court, asserting
error in submission of a single damage issue. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court, finding plaintiff had suffered an indivisible injury, thereby subjecting each
defendant to liability for the total damages caused. Id. at 311-12, 302 S.W.2d at 656. See
also Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in PersonalInjury Actions, 18 S.TEx. L.J.
217, 256-59 (1977) (indivisible injury).
14. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (recognizing shift in burden of proof
under Landers); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 319-20 (4th ed. 1971)
(construing Texas indivisible injury cases as imposing burden of proof of basis for division
upon defendants).
15. Riley v. Industrial Fin. Serv. Co., 157 Tex. 306, 310, 302 S.W.2d 652, 655-56 (1957).
16. Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935, opinion adopted). The Bradshaw court, in applying the rule that an injured party is
entitled to but one satisfaction for his injury, noted that the rule of one satisfaction was "in
no sense modified by the circumstance of more than one tortfeasor" being at fault. Id. at
104, 84 S.W.2d at 705.
17. Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925), af/'d, 280
S.W. 546 (Tex. Comm'n App., judgmt adopted); see T. L. James & Co. v. Statham, 558
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liable are thereby released. 9 Take for example the typical indivisible injury case in which a party sustains injury in a collision involving the combined negligence of the drivers of two vehicles.2" If
that party enters into a full settlement and releases all claims
against one driver, or seeks and obtains a judgment against one
driver, which is subsequently paid, the claim is deemed fully satisfied, precluding recovery against the other driver.
The rule of one satisfaction is the substantive keystone in determining the procedural consequences of settlement.2 Frequently,

S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1977) (payment of judgment amount into court registry deemed satisfaction of claim); Burrell v. Cornelius, 588 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (community property division served to satisfy claim).
18. See Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1935, opinion adopted) (prior settlement with joint tortfeasor equal to judgment
against nonsettling tortfeasor).
19. See T. L. James & Co. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1977). The court, in
analyzing plaintiff's plea that a court decree ordering payment into the registry of the court
should not operate to divest a claimant of the right to proceed against a joint tortfeasor not
joined under the suit upon which appeal was taken, stated the following as the controlling
rule:
[I]t is a universal rule that where there has been a judgment against one of two or
more joint tortfeasors, followed by an acceptance of satisfaction, all other tortfeasors
are thereby released, and the judgment and satisfaction may be successfully pleaded
by them to the maintenance of the same or another suit by the same plaintiff involving the same cause of action. The rule is applied to joint tortfeasors because of the
fundamental fact that there is but a single injury, in itself and of itself indivisible,
and constituting an indivisible cause of action, for which both in law and good conscience there can be but one satisfaction; and when that satisfaction is made by one
of the joint tortfeasors, or by any person, it has the effect of releasing all others who
may be jointly, or jointly and severally liable.
Id. at 868 (quoting Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, 938 (Tex. Civ, App.-San Antonio 1925),
aff'd, 280 S.W. 546 (Tex. Comm'n App., judgmt adopted)); cf. Clemtex, Ltd. v. Dube, 578
S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (settlement proceeds
from party adjudged not joint tortfeasor do not constitute satisfaction of claim). See also
Broadway Plan v. Ravenstein, 364 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (partial payment of judgment does not release other joint tortfeasors).
20. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 101, 84 S.W.2d 703, 703 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1935, opinion adopted) (passenger of bus injured in collision with railroad);
Hicks v. Brown, 128 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939), modified on other
grounds, 136 Tex. 399, 151 S.W.2d 790 (1941) (passenger of taxicab injured in intersectional
collision); Spears Dairy, Inc. v. Davis, 124 S.W.2d 159, 159-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1939, no writ) (passenger of third vehicle injured in successive collisions precipitated by
accident between two other vehicles).
21. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1935, opinion adopted); Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 414-15 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 150, 171-72 (1947).
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confusion results in distinguishing a release from a satisfaction,
such confusion stemming from the common law "unity of release"
rule. Historically, the release of one of two tortfeasors who acted in
concert necessarily released the other; there being in the eyes of
the law but one cause of action, the release of a tortfeasor liable
therefore was deemed a surrender of the cause of action.2 The
common law unity of release rule, finding its legal basis in the idea
of unity of obligation or injury, was expressly overruled by the
Texas Supreme Court in McMillen v. Klingensmith.2 3 Noting the
confusion attendant in adherence to the common law rule, the McMillen court provided clarification to the doctrines of settlement,
release, and satisfaction.2 A full and complete settlement with one
tortfeasor fully satisfies the injured party, satisfaction being acceptance of complete compensation for the cause of action.2 5 A release, on the other hand, is a surrender of the cause of action, and
may be based on a gratuitious consideration.26 Under McMillen
only the party named in the release, and not the entire cause of
action, is released.2 7 The claimant's right to proceed against remaining tortfeasors is not thereby precluded. As the claimant is
entitled to only one satisfaction, however, even though the settlement attributable to the release is intended as partial, if the consideration received fully satisfies the claim there can be no further
recovery against the nonsettling tortfeasors.25 Conversely, if the

22. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., Sims v.
Auringer, 301 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Borden
v. Sneed, 291 S.W.2d 485, 487-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Phillips v.
Wright, 81 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ dism'd); cf. Cannon v.
Pearson, 383 S.W.2d 565, 567-70 (Tex. 1964) (recognizing modern trend of courts to look to
parties' intent; release merely raises presumption of total surrender of cause of action). In
an effort to ameliorate the harsh effects of the unity of release rule, several jurisdictions
favored such devices as a covenant not to sue or a release containing an express reservation
of the cause of action against non-settlors. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 19596 (Tex. 1971) (citing Texas cases approving use of such contractual forms).
23. 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971).
24. See id. at 195-97; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301 (4th
ed. 1971).
25. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1971) (quoting Prosser, Joint
Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413, 423 (1937)).
26. Id. at 195.
27. Id. at 196. See also Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Tex.
1980) (release of employee does not release employer; extending McMillen holding to releases in vicarious liability controversies wherein parties not true joint tortfeasors).
28. See Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n
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settlement accomplishes only a partial satisfaction, the claimant
can attempt full compensation by proceeding against the
nonsettlors.
1. Partial Settlement with Less than All Tortfeasors. There
are several devices by which the injured party may settle part of
the claim with less than all tortfeasors and proceed against nonsettling tortfeasors. These are known as covenants not to sue, 9 partial releases,3 0 and reservation of rights agreements."1 The effect of
such a settlement upon the right to recover from the nonsettling
tortfeasor depends, in large measure, upon the procedural posture
in which the problem arises.
If a claimant has received full satisfaction for the damages attributable to an indivisible injury, a subsequent cause of action is
barred, even though the settlement was obtained through a partial
3 the operation of the
release.,3 In Bradshaw v. Baylor University,"
"one satisfaction" rule was brought to bear when plaintiff, a passenger on a bus owned and operated by Baylor University, was injured in a collision between the bus and a train. Bradshaw entered

App. 1935, opinion adopted).
29. See Gillette Motor Transp. Co. v. Whitfield, 186 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at
303 (4th ed. 1971). See also Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L.
REV. 326, 334-35 (1965) (release distinguished from covenant not to sue).
30. See McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1971) (only named party
released); cf. Loy v. Kuykendall, 347 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (release expressly limited to personal injuries, not general release of cause
of action for property damage).
31. See Riley v. Industrial Fin. Serv. Co., 157 Tex. 306, 311, 302 S.W.2d 652, 655 (1957);
Western Guar. Loan Co. v. Dean, 309 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). As noted by Prosser, jurisdictions use the designation of reservation of rights
and covenant not to sue interchangeably when addressing the issue of partial releases. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 303-04 (4th ed. 1971). Frequently, a
release entitled "Covenant Not to Sue" will include a reservation of rights agreement. See,
e.g., Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Tex. 1964); Liberty Ins. Co.
v. Rawls, 358 S.W.2d 920, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, no writ); Gomez v. City
Transp. Co., 262 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Recent
pronouncements of the Texas Supreme Court have abrogated the need to expressly reserve
the right to proceed with a cause of action against non-settling tortfeasors. See Knutson v.
Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Tex. 1980); McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467
S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1971).
32. See Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1935, opinion adopted); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26
TEXAS L. REV. 150, 172 (1947).
33. 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935, opinion adopted).
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into a partial settlement with the railroad for $6,500.00. In a subsequent action against Baylor University, a verdict of $6,500 was rendered. The court held rendition of a take-nothing judgment
proper; the money received in consideration for the covenant not
to sue nonetheless being payment as compensation for plaintiff's
injuries, fully satisfying the claim."'
If a partial settlement is made for less than full satisfaction,
plaintiff retains a viable cause of action for damages against nonsettling tortfeasors, proportionately reduced under the rule of Pal5 In addressing the substantive
estine Contractors,Inc. v. Perkins.3
consequence to be afforded the nonsettling tortfeasor of a previous
settlement agreement, the Palestine court set out the following basic rule: A plaintiff settling part of the claim for less than the determined amount of damage is required to deduct the amount received from the settling tortfeasor, but in no event receives more
than one-half of the sum determined by the jury.36 The alternative
selected by the court as the most effective method of harmonizing
the conflicting interests of each party3 7 can be broken down into

34. Id. at 104, 84 S.W.2d at 705. As is apparent from the operation of the single satisfaction rule, procedural devices such as a release containing a reservation of rights are not
the controlling determinant; regardless of the claimant's intent as contained in the settlement agreement, a subsequent recovery is foreclosed if plaintiff is deemed fully compensated. See T. L. James & Co. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1977) (judgment tendered into registry of court, even though unclaimed, is legal compensation satisfying claim);
Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925), aff'd, 280 S.W. 546
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, judgmt adopted).
35. 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
36. See id. at 773. See generally Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005, 1007 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 170-72 (1947). The Palestine Contractors court, in setting out a definitive rule for application of pro rata versus credit recovery allowed a nonsettlor, adopted Professor Hodge's interpretation of Gattegno. See Palestine Contractors,
Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 771-73 (Tex. 1964). The fact of settlement with one ultimately found to be a tortfeasor acts as a proportionate release based on the variable of total
number of defendants. The claimant is deemed to have released one-half, or one-third, or
one-fourth of his case depending on how many defendants are found to be tortfeasors. See
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 170-72
(1947); Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 326, 335-38
(1965).
37. See Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tex. 1964) (settlor's interest in finality of settlement, claimant's interest in full satisfaction, co-tortfeasor's
interest in contribution); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 80-82 (1978) (problems with application of the Palestine
rule).
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the following elements: (1) in keeping with the rule of one satisfac-

tion, the amount received in settlement is to be credited against
the liability assessed the nonsettling tortfeasor; and (2) in effectuating the legislative scheme of distribution of liability among joint
tortfeasors under contribution, a nonsettling defendant will in no
event be required to bear more than his pro rata share of liability
assessed.3 e The principle enunciated was deemed equitable, inasmuch as the pro rata reduction allowed the nonsettling tortfeasor
satisfaction of the substantive right to contribution while insuring
the settlor the finality of complete release from subsequent liability to a co-defendant." The party standing to lose under the "pro
rata reduction" rule is the plaintiff.0 As noted by the court:
The unattractive feature of this rule is that the plaintiff will not
receive the full compensation to which the jury found him entitled.
His total recovery under this method will be as near to total compensation as is the settlement to one-half of the damages. In other
words any loss would be due to the plaintiffs own action in settling
41
with one joint tortfeasor in an arm's length transaction.
Subsequent judicial interpretation of the Palestine doctrine implies a juristic approach grounded in the common law concept
42
of unity of injury/unity of obligation to joint tortfeasor liability.
38. See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (substantive law concerning effect of settlement under contribution statute); Hodges,
Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REV. 150, 170-72 (1947).
39. See Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tex. 1964).
40. See id. at 768. Because of the speculative nature of some claims, a plaintiff faces the
risk of an inadequate settlement operating to effect a pro rats deduction in recoverable
damages under the Palestine rule. See Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 87-88 (1978) (trial strategy); Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 326, 338 (1965) (citing dilemma faced
by claimant as factor discouraging settlement).
41. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1964); cf. Gillam v.
Alford, 69 Tex. 267, 271, 6 S.W. 757, 759 (1887) (voluntary settlement agreement, as arm's
length transaction, enforced per express terms). Under the facts of Palestine Contractors,
claimant's settlement agreement, in the form of a covenant not to sue, stated no suit would
be instituted, "directly or indirectly," against settlor. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins,
386 S.W.2d 764, 765 n.1 (Tex. 1964). As reasoned by the court, adoption and application of
the pro rata reduction rule was necessary to insure finality of and adherence to the express
terms of the settlement. See id. at 767-68. See also Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REV. 150, 172 (1947) (allowance of claim for indemnification against settling tortfeasor amounts to indirect claim against settlor).
42. See, e.g., McCrary v. Taylor, 579 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979,
writ ref'd); Leong v. Wright, 478 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
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The pro rata reduction principle applies only when nonsettling
joint tortfeasors and tortfeasor settlors alike have been found negligent." In the absence of a judicial interpretation of the settlor's
theoretical liability, the reduction in judgment in proportion to the
number of settlors is not allowed. The amount of settlement is
simply subtracted from the judgment; the nonsettling tortfeasor in
such instance receiving a pro tanto credit in accordance with the
"single satisfaction" rule." The following examples are illustrative
of the pro rata and pro tanto reduction principles.
Plaintiff settles with one tortfeasor by partial release for $6,500.
Plaintiff sues a second tortfeasor, receiving a verdict of $8,000.
Plaintiff is required to deduct the amount received from the settling tortfeasor (single satisfaction rule), and is, therefore, entitled
to $1,500 from the nonsettling tortfeasor. If, however, the jury had
awarded $15,000, operation of the pro rata reduction rule (unity of
injury/unity of obligation) would allow recovery of $7,500 from the
nonsettlor; an award of $30,000 would subject the nonsettlor to a
liability of $15,000; etc. The nonsettling tortfeasor has received, indirectly, under a pro rata reduction, the proportionate reduction
otherwise allowed a joint tortfeasor under contribution. The settling tortfeasor is assured the finality of settlement, no right of
contribution remaining.
Given the above example, had the settlor not been adjudicated a
tortfeasor, a settlement of $1,500 in the instance of a $15,000 verdict would result in the nonsettling tortfeasor receiving a pro tanto

1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no credit allowed from settlement attributable to
divisible injury); Clemtex, Ltd. v. Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (settlement by party determined not negligent not considered as contributing to plaintiff's satisfaction).
43. See Rexroat v. Prescott, 570 S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Leong v. Wright, 478 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26
TEXAs L. REV. 150, 171 (1947) (application of pro rata deduction only "where. . . contribution is otherwise in order"). See generally Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 81-83 (1978) (application of Palestine
Contractors rule in various contexts when settlor not determined joint tortfeasor).
44. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir.
1969) (applying Texas law); Connell v. Rosales, 419 S.W.2d 673, 679-80 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1967, no writ); Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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reduction only, with plaintiff obtaining a $13,500 judgment. As no
right to contribution would obtain in such situation, the nonsettling defendant would not be allowed a pro rata reduction. In the
true sense of the maxim, the reason for the rule having ceased, so
does the rule.
2. Partial Settlement Under Article 2212a." The concept of
joint and several liability is altered in several respects under
Texas' statutory scheme of "modified" comparative negligence."
As pertains to the substantive effects of settlement on tort liability, the basic precepts of Bradshaw and Palestine Contractors
have been incorporated in subsections (2)(d) and (e). 4 7 The governing principle of "one satisfaction" underlies the statutory provisions dealing with apportionment of damages among remaining
tortfeasors when a partial settlement has been previously consummated. The rules of contribution as developed under pre-2212a
case law continue, but are modified in accordance with the comparative fault scheme of the statute. 8
Article 2212a applies only to negligence actions. 9 Concerning the
45. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
46. See generally Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 933 (1979); Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in
Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655 (1974).
47. See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). In construing section 2 of article 2212a, the court stated:
[Tihe evident purpose of this section is to apply the scheme of comparative negligence so as to require contribution from each defendant in proportion to the negligence attributable to him, rather than to require an equal contribution from each
tortfeasor, as formerly required by article 2212, but still to permit only one satisfaction of his damages.
Id. at 416. The Deal court found no indication in the statutory provisions relating to the
effect of settlements of legislative intent to change the underlying rule of Bradshaw. The
court further stated the consequence of subsection (e) regarding a prior settlement is that
the settlement was conclusive of a settlor's liability, thereby precluding any claim for contribution, in accord with the implications underlying Palestine Contractors.See id. at 417. See
also Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5
ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 662-66 (1974) (settlements with joint-tortfeasors).
48. See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Compare id. at 420 ("subdivision 2(d) as giving full effect to the Bradshaw rule in
the context of comparative negligence") with Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516,
519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (proportionate "credit" and not proportionate reduction, appropriate remedy allowed non-settling defendant under article
2212a). See generally Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas
Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 83-85 (1978).
49. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss2/2

12

Edgar: Procedural Aspects of Settlement: An Overview of Texas Law Lawyer

1980]

SETTLEMENT OVERVIEW

effect of a partial settlement, the article administers rules apportioning recoverable damages on the basis of whether the settling

tortfeasor is a party to the suit, that is, whether the settlor's proportionate degree of fault has been judicially determined. 0 Under
subsection 2(d), addressing the situation in which the settlor's rela-

tive degree of negligence is not submitted to the jury, each defendant is allowed to deduct from the amount for which he is liable
under the judgment a percentage of the settlement amount, equal
to his adjudicated degree of fault.5 1 Operation of this subsection

thus positions a previous partial settlement as a credit available to
remaining defendants, following the pro tanto reduction rule fashioned under the general principles of both Bradshaw and Palestine
Contractors. Conversely, when the settlor is joined as a party defendant, and his negligence determined by the jury, subdivision
(2)(e) provides for a reduction in recoverable damages based on the
proportion of negligence of the settling tortfeasor.2 The consequence of the settlor's adjudication of relative fault is to preclude

recovery beyond the determined extent of liability and to allow
proportional reduction of liability assessed nonsettling co-defendants, a modified form of the pro rata reduction rule of Palestine
Contractors.

50. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2(d)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980). See
generally Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV.
933, 943-49 (1979).
51. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
If an alleged joint tortfeasor pays an amount to a claimant in settlement, but is never
joined as a party defendant, or having been joined, is dismissed or nonsuited after
settlement with the claimant (for which reason the existence and amount of his negligence are not submitted to the jury), each defendant is entitled to deduct from the
amount for which he is liable to the claimant a percentage of the amount of the
settlement based on the relationship the defendant's own negligence bears to the total negligence of all defendants.
Id. See generally Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH
L. Rev. 933, 943-45 (1979).
52. See Tex. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
If an alleged joint tortfeasor makes a settlement with a claimant but nevertheless is
joined as a party defendant at the time of the submission of the case to the jury (so
that the existence and amount of his negligence are submitted to the jury) and his
percentage of negligence is found by the jury, the settlement is a complete release of
the portion of the judgment attributable to the percentage of negligence found on the
part of that joint tortfeasor.
Id. See generally Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 Tex. TECH
L. REV. 933. 945-48 (1979).
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Application of the principles of comparative negligence to the
substantive rules of settlements portends results indicated by the
following examples:
Case 1. Amount received in settlement equals or exceeds damages found by the jury. Plaintiff enters into partial settlement
with one tortfeasor for $5,000 and subsequently sues a second
tortfeasor under article 2212a. The jury finds damages of $5,000.
Plaintiff, who has received full satisfaction, can recover nothing
from the second tortfeasor, thereby receiving a take nothing
judgment."3
Case 2. Amount received in settlement less than damages
found by jury: percentage of settlor's negligence not submitted to
the jury. Plaintiff settles with tortfeasor one for $2,000. Jury finds
plaintiff 40% negligent, tortfeasor two 60% negligent, and damages to be $10,000. Tortfeasor two receives a credit of the settlement amount. Thus plaintiff recovers $4,000 from tortfeasor two
which, added to the sum already obtained from the settling
tortfeasor, gives plaintiff a total recovery of $6,000.11
Case 3. Amount received in settlement less than damages
found by jury: percentage of settlor's negligence is submitted to
the jury. Plaintiff settles with tortfeasor one for $2,000. Jury finds
plaintiff 20% negligent, tortfeasor one 20% negligent, and
tortfeasor two 60% negligent. Plaintiff's damages are $10,000.
Tortfeasor one, as a settling tortfeasor, is provided a complete release of the portion of the judgment attributable to the percentage
of negligence so determined. Thus plaintiff recovers $6,000 from
tortfeasor two which, added to the $2,000 obtained from tortfeasor

53. See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 419-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); cf. T. L. James & Co. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. 1977) (reaffirming
principle of only one satisfaction allowed). But cf. Clemtex, Ltd. v. Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813,
814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when settlor impleaded and found
not negligent, amount of settlement not considered as compensation or satisfaction for
plaintiff's injury). Under the governing principle that a plaintiff is not entitled to more than
one satisfaction, when the settlement amount equals a subsequent judgment, plaintiff is
deemed fully satisfied. The provisions of article 2212a allowing for a credit or proportionate
reduction in accord with the settlor's assessed degree of liability are inapplicable. See Deal
v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980); Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 933, 943-45
(1979); Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice,
5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 663-64 (1974).
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one in settlement, allows plaintiff a total recovery of $8,000.11
Texas settlement procedures under comparative negligence continue the principle adopted under Palestine Contractors, stemming from policy considerations favoring settlements, of absolving
the settling tortfeasor from liability beyond the amount of settlement. A remaining issue is which party will bear the consequence
of an inadequate settlement. 6 If the percentage of the settling
tortfeasor's negligence is not submitted to the jury, the plaintiff
recovers the full amount determined by the jury and the non-settling tortfeasor, receiving a variable reduction of the amount owed
under the judgment, bears the loss. 57 If the settling tortfeasor's
negligence is submitted to the jury, the non-settling tortfeasor is
liable to plaintiff for the full amount attributable to his determined percentage of negligence, the settlor's liability under an adjudicated degree of fault being completely released.58 In such case
the amount plaintiff actually receives will vary, depending on the
amount paid in settlement.5 9
Inasmuch as the injured party's primary objective is to receive
full compensation, balancing the amount of a possible settlement
against an anticipated specified percentage of negligence by a potential settling tortfeasor is a fundamental, crucial decision.60 An
initial question, the propriety or necessity of submitting the percentage of a settling tortfeasor's negligence to the jury under article 2212a, has no clear answer. The literal wording of subsections

55. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980); Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 933, 945-48
(1979); Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice,
5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 663-66 (1979); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 84 (1978).
56. See Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, ComparativeNegligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 663-66 (1979); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 84 (1978).
57. See note 52 supra and accompanying text; Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative
Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 663-64 (1974).
58. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
59. See note 53 supra and accompanying text; Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative
Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 664-66 (1974).
60. As suggested by one commentator, "[t]he plaintiff who partially settles a claim to
be governed by article 2212a should assess his claim against the potential settlor in terms of
the expected judgment multiplied by his estimation of the percentage of the settlor's liability." Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST.
MARY'S

L.J. 75, 88 (1978).
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2(d) and (e) of article 2212a would indicate that its drafters were
of the opinion that the percentage of a settling non-party tortfeasor's negligence would not be submitted." An argument has
been made, however, that the absence of a settling tortfeasor as a
party defendant should not preclude submission of issues on the
existence and percentage of his negligence, the theory being that
"the distinction should be between a settlement made with one
who was not legally liable and one who was. '"'

Madison,6"

2

As noted in a dis-

cussion of this issue in Deal v.
the implications of the
Palestine doctrine in section 2 of article 2212a that a settlement
operates as a proportionate discharge of damages, thereby obviating the necessity of claims for contribution, renders the practice of
impleading a settlor, against whom no further relief can be granted
as between the original parties, "an empty formalism."64 If, however, the non-settling tortfeasor has a cross-claim or third-party
claim for indemnity or contribution against the settling tortfeasor,
plaintiff's release of the latter will not preclude submission of the
percentage of the settlor's negligence to the jury. Because the decision to assert this claim and the procedural joinder to protect contribution rights necessarily belongs to the non-settling tortfeasor, a
plaintiff is well advised to assess a potential settlement with regard
to a prospective percentage reduction in recoverable damages."
3. Partial Settlement of a Claim Involving a Strict Liability
Tortfeasor. In the event of partial settlement of a claim in which
either the settlor or non-settlor is accountable in strict liability in
tort, contribution rights and the treatment of partial settlement
are determined by principles arising under the general contribu61. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Several

commentators discussing 2212a make the same assumption. Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 933, 939-40 n.32 (1979) (citing authority). An alternative construction, however, would be that the language of article 2212a
should not be literally construed, inasmuch as subsection 2(e) may have been intended to
allow defendants the option of impleading the settlor. Id. at 945 n.61.
62. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1974); see Deal v.
Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 414-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing
practice of filing third-party claims to insure proportionate reduction of damages).
63. 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. Id. at 415-16; accord, Dorsaneo & Robertson, ComparativeNegligence in Texas, 10
TEx. TECH L. REV. 933, 945-49 (1979).
65. See Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 666 (1974); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 87-88 (1978).
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tion statute, article 2212.68 . In such case apportionment of recoverable damages is governed by the Palestine doctrine.6 7 Thus, if
plaintiff sues two tortfeasors, each upon theories of strict liability
or one on a negligence theory and the other on strict liability in
tort, a settlement with one tortfeasor entitles the nonsettlor to a
credit for the amount of the settlement, plaintiff recovering no
more than one-half the sum determined as damages by the jury.
B. Divisible Injuries by Multiple Tortfeasors: Severability of
Claims
Plaintiff's injuries are sometimes divisible. That is, it can be
proven that one tortfeasor broke plaintiff's jaw and another tortfeasor broke his leg. In such instances, the general elements of a
tort action, mandating liability be imposed only to the extent a
tortfeasor's acts are determined to be the proximate cause of injury, negate a conceptualization of joint liability. 8 Each tortfeasor
is liable only for the damages shown to have been caused by his
negligent conduct, the burden of proof as to causal connection resting upon the plaintiff." Factual and medical proof of severability
66. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977). As reasoned by the Simmons court, the Texas comparative negligence statute speaks only of negligence, whereas the contribution statute is expressly applicable to all torts. Because strict
liability is based in tort, and further, because no system of apportionment of damages between a negligent and a strictly liable co-defendant is presented under article 2212a, article
2212 was deemed controlling. See id. at 862; Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
28 Sw. L.J. 1, 8 (1974). See also Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 T.x. TECH L. REV.
23, 39 (1979); Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent and Strictly Liable
Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323, 346-47 (1980); Comment, Comparative Causation,Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 589-91 (1979).
67. See notes 35-43 supra and accompanying text; Sales, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Negligent and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323, 347-48 (1980).
68. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 317-21 (4th ed. 1971);
Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 217,
260 & n.201 (1977). See also Win. Cameron & Co. v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 307, 309-10
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (no requirement to pay damage
caused by another); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L.
REV. 150, 152 (1947) (contribution statute inapplicable to party not a tortfeasor).
69. See, e.g., Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Ector, 116 S.W.2d 683, 685-86 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1938, opinion adopted) (charge of the court should instruct as to elements of damage
stemming from defendant's acts); Tyler Mirror & Glass Co. v. Simpkins, 407 S.W.2d 807,
812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff's burden of proof); Phillips v.
Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 323 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (separate acts producing separate injuries not susceptible of imposition of joint and
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of damages may be readily ascertainable in the more obvious cases
of successive injuries occurring to different parts of the body, and
likewise as to injuries to the same portion of the body due to distinct negligent acts. 70 Elements of proof establishing tortfeasor
conduct separated by an interval of time and attributable to actions not undertaken in concert may provide a basis for determination of the injury as divisible.1 To the extent a plaintiff is able to
segregate a claim of injury, a previous partial settlement, having no
bearing upon satisfaction of a separate claim, should have no effect
on the remaining tortfeasor's liability. In such instance no claim
for contribution will lie and no credit or proportionate reduction is
demanded for any previous payment made by a settlor.7 When the
conduct of each tortfeasor combines to produce a single injury capable of apportionment, damages are divisible. Application of the
rule of one satisfaction, however, requires a previous settlement be
given effect, with the judgment against the non-settling tortfeasor
being credited with the amount of settlement. 7 To prevent the
non-settling tortfeasor from obtaining a pro rata reduction under
the Palestine Contractors doctrine or a percentage reduction
under article 2212a, plaintiff's attorney should make certain of two
things. First, the settlement agreement should clearly state the
specific injury or injuries which are the subject of the settlement.
Second, as regards trial strategy, counsel should submit a damage
issue clearly excluding the damages received in settlement, or, alternatively, the judgment should allow a credit for the amount of
settlement. Plaintiff's goal of full compensation can thereby be adequately safeguarded.

several judgment).
70. See Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S.
TEx. L.J. 217, 260-61 (1977).
71. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 317-20 (4th ed. 1971); see,
e.g., Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (loss of hearing injury separate from additional injuries asserted under malpractice claim); Leong v. Wright, 478 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (injury to leg from automobile accident stipulated separate from subsequent loss of leg from improper cast setting); Phillips v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 323
S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (separate back injuries
from separate acts of negligence).
72. See Leong v. Wright, 478 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.)
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. See Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 (2nd ed. 1979).
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III.
A.

FROM DEFENDANT'S VIEWPOINT: OPTIONS AVAILABLE

Indemnity

1. Common Law Indemnity. As between defendants in multiple tortfeasor controversies application of the statutorily defined
right of contribution may operate to reduce ultimate liability. The
forerunner to legislative recognition of the principles of proportionate reduction in liability is to be found in the concept of common law indemnity.74 While refusing to recognize any right of contribution among tortfeasors deemed equally culpable, or in pari
delicto, the common law, in the proper situation, readily made allowance for what could categorically be termed a right to full reimbursement for damages paid under the theory of indemnification. 5
That is, when allowed, the party paying damages, the "indemnitee," to an injured party would be entitled to recover 100% of the
amount paid from a tortfeasor "indemnitor."
Grounded upon basic equitable principles of unjust enrichment,
there is no single test or general rule available for application of
the principle of indemnity.7 s Situations giving rise to imposition of
the duty to indemnify can be classified on the basis of the nature
of liability as involving a right (1) implied in law from a pre-established relationship of the parties, or (2) existing by virtue of a separate liability of the indemnitor arising from the commission of a
legal wrong against the indemnitee." Within this framework the
following instances can be identified as ones in which indemnity
may be granted.
74. The following initial distinctions between indemnity and contribution are necessary. The right to indemnity is a creation of the common law; the right to contribution
exists by virtue of statutory authorization. Under the general contribution statute, article
2212, the two rights are not coextensive. In situations allowing indemnification, per the common law theory of recovery, contribution is not available. Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d
787, 797 (Tex. 1962); see Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L.
REV. 150, 152 (1947).
75. See, e.g., Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 435, 216 S.W.2d 563, 564-66 (1949);
Connally, Contributionand Indemnity, 16 TEx. B.J. 199, 199-200 (1953); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 150-62 (1947).
76. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or TORTS § 51, at 313 (4th ed. 1971).
77. Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150,
152-53 (1947); see Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Allocation of
Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 59496 (1979).
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Cases involving an imputation of liability wholly derivative of
another's fault routinely serve to position the party upon whom
vicarious liability is imposed as an indemnitee. For example, if a
plaintiff brings suit against an employer for an employee's negligence on a theory of Respondeat Superior, recovering $10,000 from
the employer, the employer is entitled to indemnity from the employee.78 A like result may obtain when a party has incurred tort
liability by performing an act not manifestly wrong, at the direction of and in reliance upon another. An agent, therefore, acting
upon his principal's direction in selling cattle not known by the
agent to be actually owned by another, may be charged by the true
owner with conversion; the agent can obtain indemnity from the
9
principal.7
When vicarious liability was not at issue, the primary theory
under which an award of indemnification was previously based was
the "imaginary lawsuit" test. The standard employed by the Texas
courts evolved into a consideration of the party seeking indemnity
as a plaintiff suing the indemnitor in tort.80 In such instance two
tortfeasors were both liable to a plaintiff but one had breached a
duty owing to the co-tortfeasor and the plaintiff while the other
had breached a duty only to the plaintiff. The latter tortfeasor was
allowed indemnity from the former on the premise that, as between themselves, the blameless tortfeasor should not bear liability. Blame, or fault, was determined by the device of the imaginary
lawsuit.8 1 Encompassed within the principles set forth were numerous transactions giving rise to the right of indemnification, previously categorized on such various distinctions as degree of duty
and passive versus active negligence.8 2 Common illustrations in78. See Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941); South Texas
Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
79. Oats v. Dublin Nat. Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 10-11, 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936) (agent as
blameless tortfeasor); cf. Westheimer Transfer & Storage Co. v. Houston Bldg. Co., 198
S.W.2d 465, 467-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (indemnification allowed against independent contractor negligent in performance of non-delegable duty of
indemnitee).
80. See Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 435, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949). See also
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 162 (1947).
81. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977); Austin Rd.
Co. v. Evans, 499 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 162 (1947).
82. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859-60 (Tex. 1977). See
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cluded application of indemnity against a supplier of goods in
favor of a retailer or user of the goods incurring liability because of
a negligent reliance on the duty of care owed by the supplier. 3 The
same result was reached when liability was imposed because of a
negligent reliance on a co-tortfeasor's agreement to correct or repair a hazardous condition. 4 In each instance the party upon
whom the indemnitee relied breached a duty to him. Additionally,
an assignment of liability on the basis of special classification giving rise to a higher degree of care, such as a common carrier, was
susceptible of qualification for indemnity as against the cotortfeasor violating the duty of ordinary care. 5
The breach of duty analysis employed under the imaginary lawsuit test presupposes co-tortfeasors charged with negligent conduct. 6 The impact of comparative negligence under article 2212a
on this concept of indemnity was recently addressed by the Texas
Supreme Court. As announced in B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, &
Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc.,S7 "the common law
right of indemnity is no longer available between joint tortfeasors
in negligence cases.""8 Under the reasoning presented in B & B
Auto Supply, the common law doctrine of indemnity, a mechanism
resulting in an entire shifting of the burden of loss, is incompatible
with the comparative fault system underlying the statutory scheme
of article 2212a; application of technical rules giving rise to imposi-

also Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 15763 (1947).
83. See Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 311, 312 & nn.1-2
(4th ed. 1971); Hodges, Contributionand Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV.
150, 156-57 (1947). See generally Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent
and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323, 338 (1980); Comment, Comparative
Causation,Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products
Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 596-610 (1979).
84. See Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 529, 235 S.W.2d 609, 623 (1950); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 312 & n.3 (4th ed. 1971).
85. Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345-46, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451-52 (1941); accord,
Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 263 (S.D. Tex. 1950), aff'd, 198 F.2d
138 (5th Cir. 1952); Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1952, writ refd n.r.e.).
86. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859-61 (Tex. 1977);
Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 434, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 160-62 (1947).
87. 603 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1980).
88. Id. at 817.
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tion of ultimate responsibility is therefore abandoned when a basis
for an assessment of percentage of fault exists.8 9 In accordance

with the court's rationale, indemnification rights based on a contractual agreement or upon derivative fault in the context of vicarious liability are excluded from the purview of the holding.9 0 Theoretically all circumstances giving rise to indemnity under the
standard embodied in the breach of duty test will, in the future, be
submitted for an allocation of damages according to fault under
the purview of article 2212a with losses between negligent tortfeasors being determined thereby.
The use of article 2212a as a judicial device to expand the concept of equalizing the allocation of loss is clearly illustrated by the
B & B Auto Supply opinion. The court expressly recognizes that
article 2212a has been interpreted to abolish the "all or nothing"
approach, as between the plaintiff and defendant in negligence
cases, 91 concluding that a consistent application of the statute
should result in a loss allocation between tortfeasors in proportion
to their respective degrees of negligence.92 With the rejection of
principles of indemnity, as pertains to negligent tortfeasors, Texas
courts are equipped with a procedure for spreading the risk of loss.
There exists, however, in the field of strict products liability, a
tort area in which common law indemnity may require re-examination. Two possible situations arise in which the problem is
presented. In one, the plaintiff recovers from one tortfeasor on a
negligence theory and from another on a strict products theory."
In the other situation, plaintiff recovers from both manufacturer
and supplier on a strict products theory."
89. Id. at 817.
90. Id. at 817.
91. Id. at 816-17.
92. Id. at 817. An additional consideration, although not expressed by the court, is that
administration of loss allocation under article 2212a will be much easier to apply than under
the "imaginary lawsuit" test. The "imaginary lawsuit," based on breaches of legal duties
owed by the tortfeasors, was dependent upon the resolution of legal, as distinguished from
factual, issues and almost always required an appellate decision to resolve the controversy
between the negligent tortfeasors. The jury will now perform that function.
93. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); BristolMeyers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 423, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
94. See Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 634, 164 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1942);
Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 557-58 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
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In the first instance, both defendants are co-tortfeasors and have
breached independent duties to the plaintiff. Accordingly, indemnity should be denied."5 Under the present state of the law, article
2212 applies and contribution is allowed upon a ratable basis.6 If,
however, comparative fault were recognized, the loss could and
similar to that recogshould be allocated by the jury in a manner
97
nized in the B & B Auto Supply opinion.

The second situation presents a somewhat different problem. In
one sense, the downstream supplier can be viewed as a mere conduit of the defective product, powerless to control or curtail the
unreasonable danger the product possesses, and therefore, in a real
sense, unable to prevent the loss. Accordingly, the ultimate responsibility should fall upon the manufacturer who placed the product
in the stream of commerce. This policy, with the attendant "riskspreading" available to the manufacturer, is one of the long standing justifications for the adoption of strict products liability." If
this policy is perceived to be sufficiently controlling at present, the
downstream supplier should continue to obtain indemnity from
those upstream so that the loss will, at least theoretically, fall upon
the manufacturer.
On the other hand, one might view the downstream supplier and
manufacturer as equally culpable, each owing independent duties
to the plaintiff, thereby positioned to require a sharing of the loss
based upon their percentages of culpability. 9 The loss, however,
under the law of strict products liability is not normally considered
to be based on personal culpability or fault. Liability focuses upon
the offending product, not the conduct of the parties in its com95. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 427-28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978); Keeton, Torts, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 13 (1978); Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Negligent and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323, 338-39 (1980).
96. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); note 66
supra and accompanying text.
97. See Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 49 (1979); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 13 (1978); Comment, Comparative
Causation,Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products
Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 590-94 (1979).
98. See Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 47 (1979). See
generally McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
99. See Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584 S.W.2d 908, 912-13 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323 (1980).
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mercial chain.100 Therefore, in the normal strict products case, the
downstream supplier, whose only involvement is the sale of the
product, should continue to obtain indemnity from the upstream
supplier and ultimately, the manufacturer.'"
Procedural effect of common law indemnification. Although,
under the present state of the law the right to indemnification in
strict products cases remains unsettled, previous decisions have established that when a tort claimant obtains a judgment against the
retailer, wholesaler, and manufacturer on strict liability, each product supplier is entitled to indemnity for the entire amount from his
supplier.10 2 When indemnification fails, contribution rights prevail
under article 2212, allowing for ratable contribution. 03 The effect
of a previous settlement by plaintiff operates to reduce plaintiff's
recovery and remaining defendants' liability under the principles
of Palestine Contractors.
In the area of vicarious liability, the procedural consequences of
a previous settlement upon rights of indemnification have recently
undergone a dramatic change. 0 4 Earlier Texas decisions had gen100. See J. SALES & J. PERDUE, THE LAW OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TEXAS 97 (1977), also
printed in 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 97 (1978).
101. See B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc.,
603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980) (abolishing indemnity between negligent joint tortfeasors;
opinion not reaching strict liability actions); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d
855, 860-61 (Tex. 1977) (citing cases allowing innocent distributor indemnification); cf. Ford
Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.) 1971, no writ) (dicta) (recognizing right to indemnity). To be distinguished from
the "normal" strict products case are certain cases in which indemnity should be denied the
downstream supplier. For example, the failure of the automobile dealer to perform the
dealer prep on a new unit or the assembler of a component part whose action combines with
the original manufacturing defect to produce injury is a stronger case for contribution than
indemnity because the downstream supplier has assumed an obligation to contribute to the
product's safety, thereby giving rise to an independent breach of duty which is not present
when he acts solely as a conduit. See Sales, Contributionand Indemnity Between Negligent
and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323, 338-39 (1980).
102. Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23, 47 (1979); see Bond
v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. 1965); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Southern Pac.
Co., 430 S.W.2d 900, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ief'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1013 (1969).
103. See Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 49 (1979) (citing
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978) and General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977)).
104. Compare Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1980) (employer liable under Respondeat Superior has right to indemnification from settlor-employee)
with B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603
S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980) (common law indemnity abrogated between co-tortfeasors in
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erally recognized that a plaintiff, by settling with a party against
whom an established right of indemnification existed, had in turn
released the indemnitee from liability.10 5 The continued vitality of
this rule was overturned in Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc.,1 6
which addressed the principles of indemnification existing under
derivative liability arising under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. 10 7 Focusing on policy considerations attendant to an application of the unity of release rule in a vicarious liability controversy,
the court held, absent a showing of satisfaction, a claimant retains
a right to proceed against the party derivatively liable. 10 8 The nonsettling tortfeasor, whose right to indemnification continues under
B & B Auto Supply,109 has the remedy of "access to the courts
for a full adjudication of his liabilities and his rights to
indemnification. "1 0
2. ContractualIndemnity. Parties are free to enter into agreements to indemnify, such representing contractual obligations con-

negligence cases though available in vicarious liability situations).
105. See Spradley v. McCrackin, 505 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 784-85 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors,
26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 112 (1947); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 86-87 (1978). The rationale employed in support of
such an approach encompasses the broad policy considerations favoring settlement agreements. See Spradley v. McCrackin, 505 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (settlor denied effect of settlement if liability imposed by indemnity recognized);
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 172 (1947)
(settlement with ultimately liable tortfeasor operates to satisfy liability).
106. 603 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1980) (overruling Spradley v. McCracken).
107. Id. at 806-07. Inasmuch as vicarious liability does not arise in favor of one
tortfeasor against another, the holding of the court in B & B Auto Supply preserved the
right of indemnification in the instance of vicarious liability. See B & B Auto Supply, Sand
Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980) (abolishing common law indemnity between joint tortfeasors in negligence actions).
108. See Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1980).
109. 603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980).
110. Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1980). The basic elements necessary to allow recovery of indemnification include demonstrating the settlor's
own potential liability, showing that the settlement was reasonable and prudent, and establishing the existence of the basic right to indemnification. See Powell v. Brantley Helicopter
Corp., 395 F. Supp. 646, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex. 1972). In addition to pursuing a separate claim for
indemnification, the non-settlor may implead the settlor in the primary action, seeking indemnity or contribution against him. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801,
803 (Tex. 1978); Petco Corp' v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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strued in accordance with general principles of contract law."1
While indemnity contracts have been held not to be against public
policy,"' enforcement of an agreement to indemnify a party
against his own negligence is subject to what may be termed the
"clear and unequivocal rule." ' s A contract providing for indemnification for negligent conduct will be valid and binding so long as
the agreement evidences the requisite intent and the language,
strictly construed, so provides. 1 4 It is not necessary for the agreement to state, in so many words, that "the negligence or other conduct" of the indemnitee is the subject of indemnity; a specific
statement of the activity or instrumentality is adequate. 1 5 This
principle, however, is more properly categorized as an exception. 1 6

111. See, e.g., Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Constr. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex.
1971); Spence & Howe Constr. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 365 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Tex. 1963);
Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 428-29, 303 S.W.2d 775, 777-78 (1957). Being part
of a written agreement, the scope and effect to be given an indemnity provision depend on
several factors:
[I]n determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, their intention will first be
ascertained by rules of construction applicable to contracts generally. At this point
neither party is favored over the other simply because their agreement is one of indemnity. After the intention of the parties has been determined, however, the doctrine of [strict construction] applies and the liability of the indemnitor under his
contract as thus interpreted will not extend beyond the terms of the agreement.
Id. at 429, 303 S.W.2d at 778. See generally Reynolds, Contracts of Indemnity in Texas, 43
TEX. B.J. 297, 297-302 (1980).
112. Spence & Howe Constr. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 365 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. 1963).
113. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Exxon Corp., 603 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1980);
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1972);
Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Constr. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1971). The basic rule is
as follows: "[A] contract of indemnity will not afford protection to the indemnitee against
the consequences of his own negligence unless the contract clearly expresses such an obligation in unequivocal terms." Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490
S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1972).
114. Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 428-31, 303 S.W.2d 775, 777-79 (1957).
See Spence & Howe Constr. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 365 S.W.2d 631, 633-34 (Tex. 1963).
115. Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 430, 303 S.W.2d 775, 779 (1957). But cf.
Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Constr. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1971) (refusing enforcement of agreement to indemnify for damages sustained "through or on account of any
act or in connection with the work of the Contractor").
116. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Exxon Corp., 603 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex. 1980). As reaffirmed by the Eastman Kodak court, the position of the Texas Supreme Court is as follows:
'[B]road general statements of the indemnity obligation are not sufficient to protect
an indemnitee against his own negligence, and . . . the only presently recognized exceptions are limited to (1) agreements in which one person clearly undertakes to
indemnify another against liability for injuries or damages caused by defects in certain premises or resulting from the maintenance or operation of a specified instru-
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The general trend of the Texas courts since the 1950's has been
progressively stricter in approaching such contracts of indemnity
as unenforceable, unless the obligation to indemnify is expressed in
clear and unequivocal terms."17 As stated by the Texas Supreme
Court on several occasions, the "express negligence" rule has been
approached as closely as possible without a total adoption. 118 The
end result is that a strict constructionalist approach is taken in the
interpretation of words of indemnity, with "nothing [read] into the
intent of the parties which is not clearly and unequivocally expressed within the four corners of the contract." 9 The crux of the
issue, therefore, lies with the careful drafting of such indemnity
provisions.
3. Methods of Enforcing Indemnity. A party entering into a
settlement agreement with a tort claimant may be entitled to indemnification from another. Inasmuch as the right to indemnity
unlike contribution does not depend upon statutory requirements
of judicially determined liability,20 enforcement of the settlor's
claim may be had upon a lesser burden of proof. The indemnitee
making a voluntary settlement without having liability judicially
mentality . . . [citing Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775
(1957) and Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. Diamond Press Brick Co., 111 Tex. 18, 222 S.W.
204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved)] ... ; (2) agreements which fall
within the peculiar circumstances of the indemnitor having complete supervision over
the property and employees of the indemnitee in connection with the performance of
the indemnitor's contract . . .[citing Spence & Howe Constr. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
365 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1963)] . . .; and (3) contracts in which there is an unequivocal
provision that indemnitor will protect and indemnify the indemnitee from any and all
liability by reason of injuries to indemnitor's employees . . . [citing Ohio Oil Co. v.
Smith, 365 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1963)].'
Id. at 212. See generally Reynolds, Contracts of Indemnity in Texas, 43 TEx. B.J. 297, 30004 (1980).
117. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Exxon Corp., 603 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1980) (citing
cases); Reynolds, Contracts of Indemnity in Texas, 43 TEx. B.J. 297, 300 (1980).
118. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Exxon Corp., 603 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1980); Firemen's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1972). See Reynolds, Contracts of Indemnity in Texas, 43 TEX. B.J. 297, 300-02 (1980).
119. Reynolds, Contracts of Indemnity in Texas, 43 TEX. B.J. 297, 299 (1980).
120. See Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1964, writ ref'd). Article 2212 makes express allowance for contribution, available
only when indemnity rights are not present, after a "judgment." Because of the wording of
the statute, courts generally permit contribution proceedings only in conjunction with judicially determined liability. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
75, 80 n.40 (1978).
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determined is required to prove his potential liability to the injured party and that the amount of the settlement was reasonable. 12 1 In other words, the settlor seeking indemnification must
faith and was reasonable
show the settlement was made in good
12 2
and prudent under the circumstances.

When a nonsettlor is asserting a right to indemnification subsequent to a partial settlement, the procedural method of asserting
the claim is clear: the settlor should be impleaded in the primary
action and a cross-claim asserted for indemnity.'2 3 It is unclear,
however, what form an assessment of liability against a settlor
should take. 24 Theoretically, when a right to indemnity is established, a court may deem the nonsettlor released by the settlement,12 5 allow a credit reduction for the amount of the settlethe nonsettlor full indemnification.2127 Under the
ment, 126 or award th
121. See Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818,
823-24 (Tex. 1972); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. McBride, 159 Tex. 442, 448, 322 S.W.2d 492,
497 (1958). An indemnitee desiring to settle with the injured party without a judicial determination of its liability should, absent an express contractual right to settle, notify the indemnitor of the pendency of the suit or claim and give the latter the opportunity to manage
or defend the proceeding or matter. Subsequent to demand being made, a refusal of liability
by the indemnitor justifies indemnitee's entering into settlement. See Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry.
v. McBride, 159 Tex. 442, 447-48, 322 S.W.2d 492, 496-97 (1958); Pan Am. Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Constr. Corp., 418 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Furthermore, an indemnitor's refusal of liability and assertion of such under motion for
summary judgment in an indemnity proceeding operates as a waiver of any right to a judicial determination of indemnitee's legal liability. Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424,
431, 303 S.W.2d 775, 779 (1957).
122. Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 431, 303 S.W.2d 775, 779 (1957).
123. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1978); Petco Corp. v.
Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. See Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 Tax. TECH L.
REV. 933, 951-52 (1979); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 86-87 (1978).
125. See Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 784-85 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allowing release of non-settling tortfeasor to avoid circuity
of of action under separate indemnity provision contained in settlement agreement). But cf.
Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Tex. 1980) (abolishing unity release
rule in settlements under vicarious liability controversies; possible circuity of action not controlling issue).
126. See Frantom v. Neal, 426 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (indicating credit appropriate when indemnity claim available against one settling out under covenant not to sue).
127. See Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. 1980); Panhandle
Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 784-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV.

933, 951-52 (1979).
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policy considerations favoring settlement agreements, construing
the settlement as a complete satisfaction and therefore a release of
the vicariously liable party, would appear to be the most consistent
approach. 2 8
B.

Contribution

1. Availability and Application. Contribution initially arose as
a mitigator of the harsh "all or nothing" approach fostered by
common law indemnity. Contribution entails the "payment by
each tortfeasor of his proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages
to any other tortfeasor who has paid more than his proportionate
part." 2 This concept inherently involves two parts: 1) all contributing tortfeasors must be found liable or, under some theory, owing to the injured party; 2) the tortfeasor seeking contribution
must have expended an amount in excess of his proportionate
share.1 30
Unlike indemnity, which traces its roots to the common law,13 1
contribution is a legal concept founded by statute.13 2 Since the en128. See Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L.
933, 951-52 (1979); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26
TEXAs L. REV. 150, 172 (1947). The rationale employed under such determination is "that to
encourage settlements, which protects [the settlor] from further liability and to give [nonsettling tortfeasors] an indemnity right, can only be accomplished by foreclosing the plaintiff from recovery." Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx.
TECH L. REV. 933, 951-52 (1979); see Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among TortREV.

feasors, 26

TEXAS

L.

REV.

150, 172 (1947).

129. Hodges, Contributionand Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150,
150 (1947).
130. See, e.g., Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005, 1007 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1932, holding approved); H.M.R. Constr. Co. v. Wolco, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hampton & Kennedy Lumber Co. v.
Whitfield, 213 S.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, no writ); TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). See generally Comment, Settlements in Multiple
Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 79-93 (1978).
131. Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 797 (Tex. 1962); Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex.
341, 344-45, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941). See generally Leflar, Contributionand Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
132. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). The Texas legislature first
enacted the contribution statute in 1917 and it has since remained unchanged:
Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered in
any suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort, except in causes wherein the
right of contribution or of indemnity, or of recovery, over, by and between the defendants is given by statute or exists.under the common law, shall, upon payment of
said judgment, have a right of action against his co-defendant or co-defendants and
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actment of Texas' contribution statute in 1917,' 3s however, courts
have confused these two distinct doctrines."" A primary indicator
that contribution, rather than indemnity, is applicable is the stature of the tortfeasors in relation to the plaintiff. Indemnity has
never been available to defendants standing in pari delicto."'
Under such a circumstance multiple tortfeasors are considered to
be equally liable, both owing an independent duty of care to the
plaintiff while in turn owing no duty to the co-defendant.' s6 Since
the co-defendants' culpabilities are balanced, neither can be
charged with unrequited liability to indemnify the other.
As previously discussed, the Texas Supreme Court recently narrowed the application of indemnity between negligent tortfeasors; 187 indemnification rights no longer exist when several negligent tortfeasors interact to injure a third party." 8 This action
may recover from each a sum equal to the proportion of all of the defendants named
in. said judgment rendered to the whole amount of said judgment. If any of said persons co-defendant be insolvent, then recovery may be had in proportion as such defendant or defendants are not insolvent; and the right of recovery over against such
insolvent defendant or defendants in judgment shall exist in favor of each defendant
in judgment in proportion as he has been caused to pay by reason of such insolvency.
Id.
133. See id. Note, however, that Texas enacted a comparative negligence statute in
1973. Id. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980). The primary difference between the two statutes
is that article 2212a has been construed to supercede article 2212 in situations involving
jointly negligent tortfeasors, but is not applicable in non-negligence actions. See General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 861-62 (Tex. 1977). Additionally, article 2212a
utilizes a modified comparative negligence approach for allocating liability, whereas article
2212 allocates loss on a pro rate basis. Compare TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212
(Vernon 1971) with id. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
134 Indemnity has on at least one occasion been erroneously labeled contribution. See
West Texas Util. Co. v. Renner, 32 S.W.2d 264, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved). Although
the court allowed contribution, indemnity was the appropriate remedy based upon the facts
and the test applied. Id. at 270; Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44
TEXAS L. REV. 326, 327 n.9 (1965).
135. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Bliss, 368 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. 1963); Strakos v.
Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 798 (Tex. 1962); Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 434-35, 216
S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949); see Keeton, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 27
INS. COUNSEL J. 630, 631 (1960).
136. See Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TExAs L. REv.
150, 152-53 (1947); Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TExAs L. REV.
326, 331 (1965).
137. See B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v Central Freight Lines, Inc.,
603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980).
138. Id. at 817. The court stated: "The common law right of indemnity is no longer
available between joint tortfeasors in negligence cases." Id. at 817.
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correspondingly broadened the scope of contribution.
2. ContributionRights in Non-Negligence Cases Under Article
2212. Texas adopted its first contribution statute, article 2212, in
1917.' The statute was enacted to spread the burden of judgment
among tortfeasors when one had satisfied the entire judgment, exceeding his pro rata share. 140 Integral to the application of article
2212 is the requirement of a judgment in the primary action."'
The statute literally requires that the right of contribution arise
from the payment of a judgment by the contributee to the tort
claimant. A payment by a tortfeasor in settlement, therefore, does
not entitle the settlor to contribution.142 In comparison, however,
an agreed judgment will entitle the contributee to contribution if,
in the contribution action, facts necessary to demonstrate the contributor's liability to the plaintiff are established. 1 8 Further, if a
judgment of dismissal is entered as the result of a successful compromise and settlement, the agreement must settle the claims
against both settling and non-settling tortfeasors if the settling
tortfeasor anticipates exercising the right of contribution against
the non-settling tortfeasor.1" ' Under such an agreement it is imper139. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 152, § 1, at 360.
140. See Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).
141. Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584 S.W.2d 908, 913 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586, 587
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon
1971) ("[a]ny person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered. .. ");
see, e.g., Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 150,
166 (1947); Comment, Indemnity and Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 15 Hous. L.
REV. 1004, 1008 (1978); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 79 (1978). It should be noted that article 2212a is not as
explicit in requiring a final judgment; however, a reasonable construction thereof would be
to require a judgment in the primary action. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
142. See Lower Neches Valley Auth. v. Beaumont, 392 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Win. Cameron & Co. v. Thompson, 175
S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, writ refd w.o.m.). In Cameron the San
Antonio Court of Civil Appeals determined that an agreement between the employee and a
co-defendant railway company did not go so far as to bar contribution. Id. at 310.
143. Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Dufflield, 385 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1964, writ ref'd); see Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584 S.W.2d 908, 911
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584 S.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F.
Supp. 14, 29-30 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586, 587
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd). In Traveler's the court set out the requirements
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ative that the settlor negotiate for the release of any absent
tortfeasor because the original plaintiff's reservation of the right to
sue a non-settling tortfeasor will bar contribution."'
The contribution rights of a settling tortfeasor against a non-settling tortfeasor hinge upon the terms of the settlement agreement."1 6 Illustrative of this concept is the court's holding in Callihan Interest, Inc. v. Duffield,4 7 in which a pre-trial agreement
was construed as an agreed judgment, satisfying the requirement
of a previous judgment. 4 8s Callihan was determined entitled to contribution from the non-settlor, Duffield, because plaintiff, in the
settlement agreement, had released all tortfeasors from any suit
arising out of plaintiff's cause of action.1 4 ' The decisive elements of
such agreed judgment, giving rise to contribution rights, include a
release of all recognized tortfeasors and payment by the settlor in
excess of his pro rata share.150 On the contrary, if a party accomplishes an accord with plaintiff which does not dismiss plaintiff's
claim as to all tortfeasors, such settlement merits no right to

contribution.' 6 '

A settlement made for less than full value of the claim does not
give rise to contribution. In Lower Neches Valley Authority v.

Beaumont,"2 the Valley Authority entered into a voluntary settleof article 2212 in reference to settlement agreements:
[Article 2212] does require . . . that the agreement receive the sanction of the
court and that a judgment be entered finally disposing of the original plaintiff's cause
of action against the defendant and the alleged joint tortfeasor. A dismissal of the
plaintiff's cause of action with prejudice upon a settlement agreement of the parties
accomplishes this result.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
145. See Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584 S.W.2d 908, 911-12
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Comment, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 333, 339 (1966).
146. If the settlement is made for full value of the claim, the right to contribution
under article 2212 is dependent upon whether the agreement resembles a "judgment" or is
merely a "settlement." See Txx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); Comment,
Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 80
(1978).
147. 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd).
148. See id. at 586, 587.
149. See id. at 586, 587. "To hold that Callihan lost its right to contribution because it
agreed to the judgment. . . would be contrary to the policy of the law to encourage settlement of cases." Id. at 587.
150. See id. at 588.
151. See id. at 587.
152. 392 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ment with the original plaintiffs and then sought contribution from
the remaining tortfeasors. 15" The court denied contribution, reasoning the Valley Authority had perfected a settlement of only a
partial value of the claim, allowing
plaintiff a cause of action
14
against the City of Beaumont.

5

In contrast to the situation of a settling tortfeasor seeking contribution from the non-settling tortfeasor is the stature of a cotortfeasor who has paid a judgment at trial. Although there are
many considerations to be contemplated by the non-settling tortfeasor, his initial concern is to have the settling tortfeasor adjudged liable for a portion of the plaintiff's injury.155 Such adjudication
can be accomplished through various methods, each designed to
satisfy the "judgment" mandate of article 2212. The most direct
method for gaining a judgment against the settlor is to join him as
a party in the main action through a third-party complaint."' The
settling tortfeasor's liability can thereby be established concurrent
with that of the non-settling tortfeasor, entitling the non-settlor to
7
contribution in the form of a ratable set-off.'
The ratable reduction formula stems from the Palestine Contractors doctrine."' Under this formula, if the plaintiff settles with
one tortfeasor for $2,000, and subsequently sues a co-tortfeasor,
153. Id. at 734.
154. Id. at 734, 736; see Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 27-28 n.24
(S.D. Tex. 1968); Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 933, 949 (1979); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 89 (1978).
155. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.
1969) (applying Texas law); Connell v. Rosales, 419 S.W.2d 673, 678-79 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ); Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 166-67 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. See Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). But cf. Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 415-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (considering application of article 2212a). In Deal v. Madison the
court felt it pointless to require the non-settling tortfeasor to join the settlor simply to determine his liability existed. The court quoted Dean Keeton in concluding: "Bringing in a
third party against whom no relief can be granted in order to determine what relief should
be granted as between the original parties is an empty formalism." Id. at 416; Keeton, Torts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1974).
157. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).
158. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1964). Regardless
of the monetary amount gained in settlement from a co-tortfeasor, the non-settling tortfeasor is entitled to a pro rata reduction based upon the number of settling tortfeasors. Id.
at 767.
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the recommended procedure for the latter tortfeasor is to join the
former by a third-party action. If the jury finds facts that would
otherwise impose joint and several liability on both tortfeasors,
and determines a damage amount of $10,000, the judgment should
award plaintiff $5,000, recoverable from the non-settling tortfeasor.
The non-settlor recovers nothing from the settling tortfeasor, as
the right to contribution has been satisfied.15 9

Conversely, assume the settlement is greater than the sum afforded by ratable reduction. There is some authority to the effect
that the non-settlor should be entitled to elect which sum he will
expend. 160 Under such circumstances it would be more advantageous for the non-settling co-tortfeasor to obtain a credit for the
amount of settlement, contributing the remainder of the judgment
rather than his corresponding pro rata share. As a result, if the
plaintiff settles with one tortfeasor for $7,000 and then obtains a
jury verdict against a co-tortfeasor for $10,000, the judgment
should award the plaintiff only $3,000.10'

Of principal importance to the non-settling tortfeasor is the joinder of settling tortfeasors in concurrent litigation. At present, a
non-settling tortfeasor's right to a credit or ratable reduction in
1 2
the absence of a determination of settlor's liability is uncertain.
It is clear, however, that a tortfeasor will not gain a pro rata reduc16
tion in liability from a settling tortfeasor not joined as a party. 3
Finally, if the liability of the settling tortfeasor, though joined as a
party, is not established, a question exists as to whether the nonsettling tortfeasor should receive either credit or ratable reduc159. See id. at 767, 773. See generatly Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005, 1007
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 171 (1947). See also Bohlen, Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 567 (1936).
160. Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV.
933, 944 (1979). See also Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (construing article 2212a contribution rights).
161. See Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 933, 944 & n.57 (1979).
162. See id. at 946 n.68; Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 82, 90 n.116 (1978).
163. Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 167-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965,
writ ref d n.r.e.); accord, E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 375 (5th
Cir. 1969) (applying Texas law); Connell v. Rosales, 419 S.W.2d 673, 679 (Tex. Civ.,
App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ).
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tion.' e' Since the non-settling tortfeasor would probably have been
entitled to a credit had there been no joinder by the third-party
action,'0 5 a credit has been recommended as the proper procedural
consequence. '6

If the settling tortfeasor is not joined as a party in the main action and the amount of settlement is less than one-half the damages, the non-settling tortfeasors are allowed a credit for the settlement and contribution against each other.'0 7 For example, consider
the situation where plaintiff settles with one tortfeasor for $1,000
and sues two co-tortfeasors, who seek contribution from one another. Liability is established and plaintiffs damages are found to
be $10,000. The non-settling tortfeasors are entitled to a $1,000
credit, resulting in a joint and several judgment against them for
$9,000'1 8

and providing for contribution between them of $4,500.

Had plaintiff settled with the first tortfeasor for $6,000, the joint
and several judgment should be for $4,000, with contribution rights
of $2,000 between each non-settling tortfeasor.' 9
Under more basic circumstances, a defendant is often one of several potential tortfeasors before the court, none of such tortfeasors
having settled with plaintiff. To be assured that all tortfeasors be
adjudged liable for an equivalent proportion of the verdict, each
defendant should assert a cross-claim for contribution under rule
97(e).170 Once judgment is rendered, each tortfeasor, while jointly

REV.

164. See Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH L.
933, 946 & nn. 67-68 (1979) (ratable reduction not available; credit reduction should be

allowed).
165. See id. at 946; Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 82 (1978).
166. See Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 933, 946 (1979); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies - Texas
Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 82 (1978).
167. See Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 164, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
168. See id. at 168.
169. See id. at 168.
170. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(e). The rule reads, in pertinent part:
Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such crossclaim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be
liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the
cross-claimant.
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and severally liable to the plaintiff, has a judgment against the
other tortfeasors to enforce equal payment of the award. 17 1 Union
Iron & Metal Co. v. Gibson 17 provides a good example of this concept. Plaintiff sued four tortfeasors, obtaining a joint and several
judgment for $24,500.17 The court determined that while plaintiff
could obtain satisfaction from any defendant, any one of the defendants paying more than its proportionate share of $6,125 could
seek contribution, 7 4 provided such claim had been previously asserted. Contribution, however, could only be pursued and levied
against a defendant paying less than a pro rata share of the judgment. In other words, any tortfeasor paying more than one-fourth
of the judgment would be entitled to contribution from a counter17
part paying less than that amount.
The situation will also arise when, although no settlement has
been consummated, less than all the tortfeasors are before the
court. A defendant confronted with such an event may seek leave
to file a third-party claim for contribution against the absent
tortfeasors under rule 38(a). 171
Although article 2212 would appear to require the presence of all
tortfeasors in the primary suit,1 77 a defendant is permitted to
maintain a subsequent action for contribution against an absent
tortfeasor if the latter was unknown at the time of trial or a procedural bar prevented joinder. 78s If, however, all tortfeasors have

171. Union Iron & Metal Co., 374 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. 374 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. Union Iron & Metal Co., 374 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The appellant, Mrs. Gibson, suffered injuries when hit by a Houston
Transit Company bus and a truck driven by an employee of Union Iron and Metal Company. Id. at 459-60.
174. See id. at 462.
175. See id. at 462; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 2212 (Vernon 1971).
176. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 38(a). A defendant may choose to implead additional parties
either because he believes they may be partially or totally liable for a portion of the plaintiff's recovery, or that they are directly liable so as to absolve the defendant's liability. Rule
38 defines impleader under such circumstances. Id.; see Golden State Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, no writ). See generally R.
McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT & COUNTY COURTS § 3.45.1 (1970).
177. See TEx. RE. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).
178. Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 260, 177 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1944); see
Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123, 126 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved). See also
Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005, 1007 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding
approved).
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been joined as original defendants in a non-negligence action, contribution claims should be asserted in the primary suit. Otherwise,
the compulsory counter-claim provision of rule 97(a) may have the
effect of barring a future action.' 7 ' For example, assume plaintiff
sues two tortfeasors and only one cross-claims against the other for
contribution. A joint and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff
against both defendants would allow the cross-plaintiff contribution from the cross-defendant. A subsequent action for contribution, however, by the tortfeasor who failed to file a cross-claim may
be barred by rule 97(a) as it was a compulsory counter-claim to the
cross-claim in the first action.1 80
It is important to differentiate the immediately preceding example from an action in which neither tortfeasor seeks contribution in
the primary suit."8 ' If article 2212 does not require the tortfeasors
to assert contribution claims in the primary suit, they are not precluded from a later claim under rule 97(a). Therefore, if neither
tortfeasor filed a cross-claim against the other, either could maintain a subsequent action for contribution.'
The exact status of a potential contributor not a party to the
main action remains unresolved. In CallihanInterests, Inc. v. Duffield,'85 the contributee impleaded the contributor by a third-party
179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(a). The rule reads, in pertinent part:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim within

the jurisdiction of the court, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of
filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and

does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction; provided, however, that a judgment based upon a settlement or compromise of a claim of one party to the transaction or occurrence prior to
a disposition on the merits shall not operate as a bar to the continuation or assertion
of the claims of any other party to the transaction or occurrence unless the latter has
consented in writing that said judgment shall operate as a bar.

Id.
180. Id; see Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America, 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973).

181. Hall v. Bleisch, 400 F.2d 896, 897 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (applying Texas
law).
182. Cf. id. at 896-97 (rule 97 does not bar subsequent assertion of cross-claims). It
should be remembered, however, that in a negligence action, article 2212a, subsection 2(g)
requires all named defendants to assert their contribution claims in the primary suit. See
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
183. 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd). Salt water from Callihan's oil operations fouled the fresh water on Duffield's property. Id. at 587.
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action. 18 The third-party action, however, was subsequently severed by agreement.' 85 Left undecided was whether the damages of
the first action must be relitigated before the contributor's liability
to the contributee could be fixed and the basis for contribution
established. 8
3. Contribution Rights in Negligence Cases Under Article
2212a. In comparison with the alternatives available under article
2212, discussed above, article 2212a provides the non-settling
tortfeasor with a different series of options.1 87 If, for example, there
has been no settlement under article 2212 and all of the tortfeasors
are before the court, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable
for the entire judgment. Under article 2212a, however, the negligence of each party is determined on a percentage basis. If a
tortfeasor's negligence is adjudged less than the plaintiff's negligence such tortfeasor is liable only for the percentage of his adjudicated negligence. 88 Further, each tortfeasor is permitted contribution for any sum paid to the extent payment is in excess of the
amount represented by the percentage of his own negligence. 189
Assume the jury finds plaintiff 20% negligent, and tortfeasors
one, two, and three 10%, 30%, and 40% negligent, respectively,
with plaintiff's damages at $10,000. Damages are first reduced
commensurate with plaintiff's own contributory negligence of 20%,
or $2,000; the plaintiff being entitled to a judgment of $8,000. The
tortfeasors do not contribute to the judgment equally; rather, they
are accountable for such sum to the following extent: tortfeasor
one is liable for $1,000 while tortfeasors two and three are jointly

184. Id. at 586.
185. See id. at 588.
186. See id. at 588.
187. Although contribution under article 2 2 12 a is an alternative in numerous negligence
actions, worker's compensation insurance continues to bar contribution claims arising under
the article. A tortfeasor would frequently have a valid claim for contribution against the tort
claimant's employer but for article 8306, section 5. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
§ 5 (Vernon 1925). Section 5 provides that the subscriber to worker's compensation shall
have no liability from a judgment or settlement arising out of death or injury to the subscriber's employee. An argument was recently made that article 2212a repealed section 5 by
implication. The court, however, held otherwise. See General Elev. Corp. v. Champion Papers, 590 S.W.2d 763, 764-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
188. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Texas uses a
modified comparative negligence approach which requires the plaintiff to be less than 51%

negligent to recover damages. See id. § 1.
189. Id. § 2(f).
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and severally liable for $8,000. If tortfeasor two is required to pay
more than $3,000 or tortfeasor three more than $4,000, the one
paying more than his share is entitled to contribution from the
tortfeasor paying less than his share.' 90
A second distinction arising under article 2212a concerns the express requirement that all named defendants assert their claims in
the primary suit. 9 ' If there has been no settlement and all
tortfeasors are before the court, those not seeking contribution are
barred from obtaining it in a later action. 9 ' Assume plaintiff sues
two negligent tortfeasors, but only one tortfeasor files a cross-claim
for contribution. The jury finds plaintiff 10% negligent, and each
tortfeasor negligent to a greater extent than plaintiff, with damages set at $10,000. A joint and several judgment should be entered
against both tortfeasors for $9,000, providing contribution in favor
of the cross-plaintiff against the cross-defendant for any expenditure exceeding the sum proportionate to the percentage of crossplaintiff's negligence. Since the cross-defendant did not seek contribution in the primary suit the judgment should not provide for
it and such party is precluded, under the statute, from obtaining it
in a subsequent action.1 "
If less than all tortfeasors are before the court, with no settlement perfected, the defendants presumably, assuming there are no
venue problems, have a right to seek joinder of the absent
tortfeasor by a third-party claim for contribution.' 9" Unsettled,
however, is whether the trial court should submit the percentage of
such third-party defendant's negligence to the jury.' 5 A close examination of article 2212a, subsection 2(a), which defines "claimants," reveals that third-party claimants are not included, thereby
supporting the argument that neither a third-party claim nor the
percentage of a third-party defendant's negligence are to be submitted to the,, jury.' 9 6 Otherwise, the third-party defendant, if
proven negligent, might be subject to contribution. The operation
of the statute as construed may be illustrated as follows. Plaintiff

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

2(f).
2(g).
2(g).
2(g). See also TEx. R. Civ. P. 97(a) (compulsory counterclaim).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
Id. § 2(a) (implying third party's negligence not submitted to jury).
Id. § 2(a).
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sues one tortfeasor, who maintains a third-party action against another. The jury finds plaintiff 40% negligent, the original defendant 60% negligent, and damages of $10,000. If the jury also finds
the third-party defendant liable as a co-tortfeasor, the original defendant, liable to plaintiff for $6,000, has a right to contribution, as
a third-party plaintiff, from the third-party defendant for $3,000.
Alternatively, if the trial court is allowed to submit the thirdparty defendant's percentage of negligence to the jury, the original
defendants are jointly and severally liable, with contribution rights
against the third-party defendant and one another.19 7 This is exemplified by the situation in which plaintiff sues two tortfeasors,
who maintain a third-party action against a co-tortfeasor. The jury
finds plaintiff 10% negligent, the original defendants and the
third-party defendant each 30% negligent, and damages of
$10,000. The original defendants are jointly and severally liable to
plaintiff for $9,000 and would be entitled to contribution from the
third-party defendant for $3,000. Even though the third-party defendant may or may not be financially able to effect contribution,
payment of any sum to plaintiff by an original defendant in excess
of $4,500 would entitle him to the right of contribution from the
other original defendant for the excess, and vice-versa. 1 " On the
other hand, any payment by an original defendant in excess of
$3,000 should entitle him to contribution from a third-party defendant who has paid less than $3,000.
If a tortfeasor is not joined as an original or third-party defendant, it is unclear whether the court can properly submit the absent tortfeasor's percentage of negligence in the primary action.
Subsections 2(d) and (e) of article 2212a indicate the legislature
assumed it could not.1 9 Unfortunately, this point remains unresolved; there are no cases and confusion abounds.
It is not necessary that the degree of negligence and resulting
contribution liability for an absent tortfeasor be established in the
primary action when those tortfeasors before the court are able to
assert their claims against the absent tortfeasor. A subsequent ac-

197. Id. § 2(c)-(f).

198. Id. § 2(b). The section reads, in pertinent part: "In a case in which there is more
than one defendant, . . ., contribution to the damages awarded to the claimant shall be in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each defendant." Id.
199. Id. § 2(d)-(e).
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tion for contribution against an absent tortfeasor who did not previously settle is expressly allowed. 00 Thus, a negligent defendant
who has satisfied a judgment can enforce a contribution claim in a
subsequent suit against an absent, non-settling co-tortfeasor. Such
a procedure, however, is replete with complications. Since the percentage of negligence should total 100%, a subsequent suit for contribution would logically require a relitigation and redetermination
of all parties' negligence.0 Clearly, the safest and most expeditious alternative would be for an original defendant to maintain a
third-party action against all absent co-tortfeasors so that the
rights and responsibilities of all parties to the occurrence could be
determined at one time in the main action.
The existence of a settling tortfeasor affords the non-settling
tortfeasor several options. Once the settling tortfeasor is joined as
a party by the non-settling tortfeasor, via a third-party claim, the
statute indicates the percentage of the settling tortfeasor's negligence should be submitted to the jury.20 2 The settlement operates
as "a complete release of the portion of the judgment attributable
to the settling tortfeasor's percentage of negligence."20 s The
amount paid in settlement is of no consequence to the non-settling
tortfeasors; they remain responsible for their respective liabilities
on the judgment and, if they have asserted cross-claims for contribution among themselves, the judgment should award it."0 4 For example, assume plaintiff sues two negligent tortfeasors after settling
with a third negligent tortfeasor for $2,000. The non-settling tortfeasors join the settlor by a third-party claim, and seek contribu200. Id. § 2(g).
201. If article 2212 were applied instead of article 2212a, the contributees would be

allowed contribution on a ratable basis. See Callihan Interests v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586,
587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212
(Vernon 1971). See also Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.

-Dallas

1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

202. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Article 2212a is

silent as to the rights which a settling tortfeasor may have against a non-settling cotortfeasor for contribution. One would conclude, therefore, that such a situation is governed
by article 2212. Compare id. § 2(h) with id. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).
203. Id. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980). See generally Keeton, Torts, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1974).
204. See, e.g., Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 422-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH
L. REv. 933, 947 nn. 69 & 70 (1979); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 1, 13-14 (1974).
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tion from one another through cross-claims. If the jury finds plaintiff 20% negligent, one original defendant 20% negligent, the other
original defendant and the third-party defendant each 30% negligent, and damages of $10,000, the plaintiff recovers $5,000, jointly
and severally, from the non-settling tortfeasors. Considering the
sum collected from the settlor, plaintiff receives a total of $7,000
from all tortfeasors2 0 5 The judgment should award each non-settling tortfeasor contribution from the other for an amount paid by
either in excess of the sum represented by their respective percentages of negligence.20 6 The non-settling tortfeasors have no right of
contribution against the settlor because their proportionate share
of the judgment is reduced by the amount of the settlor's percentage of negligence.20
Conversely, if the sum received from the settlor is greater than
the sum that would have been afforded by a percentage reduction,
the non-settling tortfeasor's liability is unaffected.2 0 8 The non-settling tortfeasors remain liable for the percentages of their negligence. Assume that in the preceding example the settlor had settled with plaintiff for $6,000, instead of $2,000. The non-settling
tortfeasors are still jointly and severally liable to plaintiff for the
sum of $5,000, which results in a total recovery of $11,000 by the
injured party. As before, the contribution rights between the nonsettling tortfeasors remain unchanged.
Finally, assume the non-settling tortfeasors join the settling
tortfeasor, but the jury refuses to find the settlor negligent. The
non-settling tortfeasors would be unable to obtain a percentage reduction of their liability to plaintiff.2 0 9
If the settling tortfeasor is not joined as a party in the primary
suit, article 2212a seems to assume the settlor's percentage of negligence is not to be submitted to or considered by the jury.2 10 Each

205. In such situation, it is possible that plaintiff will receive a windfall. See Comment,
Comparative Negligence in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV. 101, 112-13 (1973).
206. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
207. See id.; Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 934, 944-45 (1979).
208. See Dorsaneo & Robertson, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 934, 944-45 (1979).
209. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980). The implication is that the settlor would initially have to be found liable before the non-settlor would
be entitled to a reduction. Id.
210. See id. § 2(a).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss2/2

42

Edgar: Procedural Aspects of Settlement: An Overview of Texas Law Lawyer

1980]

SETTLEMENT OVERVIEW

defendant, however, is entitled to deduct a proportionate amount
of the settlement, determined by the ratio his negligence bears to
the negligence of all defendants. 1' The percentage of the settlor's
negligence is immaterial. The amount actually paid in settlement,
however, is of importance.2 12 As opposed to those circumstances
when the settling tortfeasor's negligence is determined as a percentage of the whole, if the settling tortfeasor is not joined the defendants are entitled to a credit, the exact amount depending on
the percentage of their own negligence.2 ' 3 The following illustrates
the procedural operation under article 2212a. Plaintiff sues two
tortfeasors after settling with their co-tortfeasor for $1,200. The
non-settling tortfeasors seek contribution from one another. The
jury finds plaintiff 20% negligent, the defendants 50% and 30%
negligent, respectively, and assesses plaintiff's damages at $10,000.
Although the defendants are jointly and severally liable, the first
defendant is entitled to a credit commensurate with the percentage
of his own negligence, or %/of the settlement ($750), his liability
being computed thusly: 50% x $10,000 = $5,000, less $750 =
$4,250. The second defendant is entitled to a credit of 3/ of the
settlement ($450), his liability being determined as follows: 30% x
$10,000 = $3,000, less $450 = $2,550. The defendants, therefore,
are jointly and severally liable to plaintiff for $6,800, with each being entitled to contribution from the other for any sum paid to
plaintiff in excess of their respective shares. Plaintiff's total recovery from all tortfeasors is $8,000. The plaintiff's recovery remains
the same regardless of the amount of settlement; the greater the
settlement, however, the lesser the actual dollar expenditure by the
non-settling tortfeasors21 4
211. See id. § 2(d). "[Elach defendant is entitled to deduct from the amount for which
he is liable to the claimant a percentage of the amount of the settlement based on the
relationship the defendant's own negligence bears to the total negligence of all defendants."
Id. § 2(d).
212. See id. § 2(d). The non-settling tortfeasors deduct their percentage based on this
amount. See id. § 2(d).
213. Id. § 2(d).
214. Assume the above facts except that plaintiff settles with tortfeasor three for
$2,400. Tortfeasor one is entitled to a credit of $1,500 (,V8x $2,400) from his percentage of
negligence, meaning his share is $3,500 (50% x $10,000 = $5,000 less $1,500 = $3,500) and
tortfeasor two is allowed a credit of $900 (3/ x $2,400) from his percentage of negligence,
meaning his share is $2,100 (30% x $10,000 = $3,000 less $900 = $2,100). The nonsettling
tortfeasors, therefore, are jointly and severally liable to plaintiff for $5,600, each being entitled to contribution from the other for any excess paid over their respective shares. Plain-
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Many tactical factors, of course, are involved in deciding
whether to seek contribution in a third-party action. This is particularly true for the non-settling tortfeasor when plaintiff has settled
with a co-tortfeasor in an action governed by article 2212a. If the
non-settling tortfeasor anticipates that the settlor has paid more
than his ultimate proportionate share, a third-party action should
not be sought. On the other hand, if the non-settling tortfeasor believes the percentage of the settlor's negligence to be greater than
the amount paid in settlement would bear, proportionately, to the
judgment, a third-party action should be seriously contemplated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The settlement of claims in which multiple tortfeasors are involved frequently pose many subsequent problems for both the
settling and non-settling parties. Consequently, the rights and responsibilities created by settlements should be carefully weighed
before they are made. While a number of unanswered questions
persisted prior to the adoption of article 2212a, there is no doubt
that it created many more which, unfortunately, can only be answered on a case by case basis as specific problems arise.

tiff's total recovery from all tortfeasors is still $8,000.
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